COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY CASE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT UNITS IN UGANDA

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ABSTRACT

This study assessed level of compliance to the procurement law, and how it affects road works delivery cost, time, and quality.

The World Bank estimates that 10-15 percent (US$ 100 million) of the US $700 Ugandan government channels through the public procurement system, gets wasted due to failure to impose sanctions for violations of the procurement rules. The National Public Procurement Integrity Baseline Survey (2006) estimates an 18 – 24 billion dollars budget loss due to procurement related fraud at LG. Reports by the inspector general of government, and the auditor general for 2007 and 2008 give prominent cases of procurement related fraud. It is these evidences that prompted the researchers to conduct this study.

A combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches was employed to collect and analyze the data. Various samples were created using Morgan and Kraije (1970) system.

The findings portray a moderate level (70%) of compliance to the law. And a weak relationship between compliance and timeliness (r = .13, p = .57), cost (r = .38, p .63), and quality (r = .18, p = .49)

1.1 INTRODUCTION:

This research project investigated compliance to the Ugandan Local Government procurement legal system, and how the compliance influences the delivery of road works. The influences were measured using parameters of timeliness, cost effectiveness, and quality of works delivered. The study was prompted by persistent reports of poor quality road works delivery, and corruption in the sector despite the enactment of procurement Act.

The act was enacted with an aim of eliminating the weaknesses in procurement practices that characterized the central tender board at local government level. However, despite the enacting of new laws, cases of poor service delivery have increased with frequent reports of corruption in the local government contract committees[1], provision of sub - standard services, and denying some consumers the relevant services. The Inspector General of Government (IGG) (2006) in a National Integrity Survey found Local Government Tender Boards (LGTB) the second most corrupt institutions in Uganda. Yet the procurement budget at local government amounts to 31% of the total LG (Local Government) budget (Integrity survey, 2006).

The objectives of the study were to establish the extent to which procurement officers at Local governments comply with the legal framework and to establish the relationship between compliance and service delivery.

Significance: A large portion (70 percent) of the local government (LG) budget passes through the procurement system, therefore failure to procure goods and services cost effectively and timely can put the achievement of key LG objectives at risk. The study will enhance and promote Procurement practices awareness in LGs in Uganda and suggest appropriate policy changes. The LGs will use the findings to improve their service delivery. It will guide policy makers at all levels in formulation of appropriate policy changes and enacting of better legislation and controls.

SCOPE: The study was carried out in Uganda, in the districts of Arua, Jinja, Kasese, and Wakiso. It focused on the observance of the amended LG act of 2006 and service delivery. Service delivery was measured basing on contract timeliness, quality, and cost parameters. The study focused on the delivery of works specifically machine based feeder roads projects. The period under consideration was 2007/2008**.**

CONCEPTUAL FRAME-WORK: In order to analyse the procurement practices and how they affect service delivery; the research team used a modified Balanced Score card (BSC) model. This model is a modification by Brackertz et al, and Vaidya et al (2002) of the original model developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992). The principle of the model is that performance should be evaluated against strategic aims balancing financial and non-financial measures.

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┌──────────────────────┐                    ┌──────────────────────┐
│ COMPLIANCE TO        │ ─────────────────▶ │ SERVICE              │
│ LEGAL SYSTEM         │                    │ DELIVERY (roads)     │
└──────────────────────┘                    └──────────────────────┘
                                                       │
                                          ┌──────────────────────┐
                                          │ Customer             │
                                          │ Perspective          │
                                          │ . Quality            │
                                          └──────────────────────┘
                          ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
                          │ Service          │        │ Financial        │
                          │ Perspective      │        │ Perspective      │
                          │ . Timeliness     │        │ . Transaction    │
                          │                  │        │ costs            │
                          └──────────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
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Source: Brackertz and Kenley (2002); balance score card, modified by researchers.

METHODOLOGY

Compliance to the amended Uganda Local Government procurement law was assessed in three interrelated perspectives:

1. Availability of road services that conform to standards/quality (to end user),
2. Economy in the use of funds, and
3. Procurement effectiveness (measured basing on cost and time dimensions).

A composite measure was developed using a Linkert scale Questionnaires for procurement officials, and service providers. The tool had 20 items based on legal procedures in a procurement process drawn from Procurement law. We measured how respondents agree or disagree to the statements that support compliance to the procedures. We used the (scale that adds up to 100) to develop the following conclusions:

1. Full compliance when 100% of the indicators are rated satisfactory
2. Substantial compliance when 80% are rated satisfactory
3. Moderate compliance when 60% are rated satisfactory
4. Marginal compliance when 50% are rated satisfactory
5. No compliance when less than 50% are rated satisfactory.

Source: Baseline indicators for good procurement practices of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reference document of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Research Design: The study was qualitative with a blend of quantitative and cross sectional multiple case study designs. A survey of end users, opinion leaders, civil servants was carried out to establish their opinions about the quality and availability of relevant road services. A description of observed phenomenon, and interview responses was carried out. To establish cost, timeliness, and quality of sampled roads, an audit was conducted on the procurement records. The quality of actual road works was verified against the original specification using experts.

Unit of Analysis: The unit of analysis is the machine – based road works/contracts.

Sampling Design: The researchers purposely selected the machine – based road construction projects that are prone to abuse because of

their value. Using simple random sampling, a sample of 10 contracts was picked from each district, making a sample size of 40.

The other sample units were selected using Krejcie and Morgan (1970) approach. It included 15 procurement officials from various committees from each sample district, 150 end users, 40 service providers, and 5 members from the regulating agencies (PPDA, and ULGA)

The criteria applied in the selection of subjects included the level of responsibility/authority (position held), stake in procurement transactions, knowledge, and experience in the field, motivation to participate in the study, Unsubstitutability of the officials, and willingness to participate.

Table 1: Sample size:

Strata	Arua	National	Wakiso	Kasese	Jinja
Service providers	10		10	10	10
Contracts	10		10	10	10
End users	140		140	140	140
Procurement officials	15		15	15	15
Regulating agencies		5			
Total	175	5	175	175	175

Instruments:

Questionnaire: Three sets of self administered questionnaires were used to collect data from end users, officials and service providers. Self administered Questionnaires were used because they are more valid than the ordinary questionnaires.

Interviewing was reserved for key government officials, opinion leaders, service providers, chairperson of relevant committees, and the accounting officers. This tool though not cost effective, in a qualitative study it is a very effective instrument for putting emphasis on key points generated through desk research and questionnaires, for generating detailed information through probes on important issues, and for substantiating certain issues.

Observation: The researchers visited all the sampled roads and got first hand experience of their conditions.

Test of Validity: To ensure construct validity this study used multiple sources of data (triangulation) to establish a chain of evidence. Multiple sources of data ensured that there is agreement on

various parameters measured (convergent validity). Internal validity was ensured by doing explanation building and addressing rival explanations. External validity was measured by using replication logic in multiple-case studies. Tools were pre-tested and discussed with various moderators from Netherlands.

DATA PRESENTATION, AND ANALYSIS

Table 2: Response rate by district

District	Expected No. Of Respondents	Actual No	Percentage response
Arua	165	140	81
Jinja	165	142	82
Kasese	165	141	87
Wakiso	165	148	91
Kampala	5	2	80
contracts	40	36	90
Total	660	471	

The response rate was very good as indicated in the table above. On average 81% response rate was realized.

Table 3: The Level of Compliance

	Arua	**Jinja**	**Kasese**	**Wakiso**
Contracts	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
1	67.0000	65.5714	60.6667	80.7143
2	67.3333	65.2857	63.3333	80.6250
2	66.3333	65.2000	63.7778	83.0000
4	77.5000	64.6667	70.0000	92.0000
5	74.0567	69.6701	71.0067	76.0734
6	69.6708	64.2246	65.8701	69.7821
7	65.0786	75.0134	59.0678	73.0478
8	66.8901	71.7811	74.9875	68.6938
9	70.0456	68.4519	67.8901	64.0856
Average	**69.32%**	**67.76%**	**66.28%**	**76.44%**

Source: Primary data from the tools

According to the table above, the average compliance level for all districts is 70%. This level of compliance is rated as moderate.

Therefore, the conclusion is that there is some level of compliance to the legal requirements at the local government level. Officials endeavour to adhere to the legal requirements. The law requires specific records of the procurement circle to be kept. Therefore, in

the audit of the records, the researchers established that most of the records testifying to the compliance are kept.

According to the audit, the specific items that scored low on compliance were in the area of transparency especially in the contract award and management.

The records (manual system) of the sampled districts are not organized, and thus retrieving some records was a problem. However the researchers had access to most of the crucial records.

Table 4: How compliance influences costs of contracts.

	Arua		Jinja		Kasese		Wakiso	
Contract	%variance	Mean	%variance	Mean	%variance	Mean	%variance	Mean
1	33	2.0000	34	1.8571	23	2.0000	12	1.5714
2	13	1.6667	27	2.0000	12	1.6667	8	1.3750
3	14	1.6667	29	1.8000	17	1.6667	20	1.7500
4	9	1.5000	26	2.0000	11	1.5000	29	2.3333
5	8	1.4576	11	1.3485	4	1.2307	0	1.1003
6	0	1.1000	10	1.3200	35	2.3486	5	1.3200
7	5	1.2349	28	1.9023	9	1.3290	31	2.3047
8	10	1.5461	7	1.3450	33	2.0004	25	2.3864
9	29	1.9453	9	1.3411	8	1.3400	6	1.3956
Average	**8.56**	**1.6797**	**16.44**	**1.6571**	**15.44**	**1.6758**	**8.89**	**1.7654**

Source: Audit of district procurement records. (key 1 = within budget, 2 = above budget, 3 = below budget).

According to the table above, all the sampled districts' contracts have an average mean of 1.6, implying that most contracts costs were above the budget – they were adjusted upwards due to reasons that were not explored by the researchers.

Level of Variance: The auditing revealed a variance between budgeted and actual costs, the average variance levels for each

district are: 9% for Arua, 16% for Jinja, 15% for Kasese, and 9% for Wakiso.

This implies that compliance does not lead to value for money in the procurement of road contracts.

Establishing how compliance influences timeliness of road services

Table 5: Timeliness of service delivery

	Arua		Jinja		Kasese		Wakiso	
Contracts	%variace	Mean	%variace	Mean	%variace	Mean	%variace	Mean
1	60	1.6250	14	2.4286	54	2.0000	45	2.0000
2	45	1.8889	23	2.1429	24	1.7778	34	2.1250
3	33	1.6667	45	2.0000	24	1.7778	21	1.5000
4	55	2.0000	24	1.6667	60	2.0000	42	2.0000
5	14	1.2340	13	1.3479	4	1.3458	14	1.4520
6	25	1.8900	14	1.2309	45	2.0056	22	1.7890
7	0	1.3429	46	2.0044	2	1.0934	14	1.2300
8	5	2.7894	40	2.0034	18	1.5328	17	1.3862
9	-12	2.3400	36	1.9034	-3	2.8922	37	2.0937
Average	**25**	**1.8641**	**28.33**	**1.8587**	**25.33**	**1.825**	**27.33**	**1.7307**

Source of data: Districts procurement records. (key 1=on schedule, 2=behind schedule, 3=ahead of schedule). The variance is in terms of months.

According to the table above, the sampled contracts in the 4 districts have an average mean of 1.8, implying that most contracts were completed late.

Variance Level: The percentage variance (in months) between the panned time and the actual time of completion is: 25% for Arua, 28%

for Jinja, 25% for Kasese, and 27% for Wakiso. Arua and Kasese had a lower variance.

This implies that compliance does not translate into timely road works delivery.

Table 6: Quality of road works

	Arua	Jinja	Kasese	Wakiso
Contracts	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
1	2.4250	2.4286	2.6000	1.3400
2	1.8889	2.1429	2.6778	2.1650
3	2.0667	2.0000	2.8778	1.9000
4	2.4000	1.5667	1.3567	2.2600
5	2.3340	2.3679	1.4458	2.4820
6	1.6900	1.8309	1.4056	1.6890
7	1.9429	1.9044	2.9934	1.4500
8	2.2367	2.0034	1.6328	2.6862
9	1.8400	1.6034	2.8922	1.7937
Average	**2.0916**	**1.9831**	**2.2091**	**1.974**

Source: District procurement records.
Key 1 = standard, 2 = below standard, 3 = above standard.

According to the table above, the sampled contracts in the 4 districts have an average mean of 1.9, implying they were not of the required standard.

This implies that compliance does not translate into quality road works.

The study explored the relationship between compliance and cost. The correlation findings are indicated below:

Table 7: Correlations : Compliance Vs cost

District	R	N	P values(2 tailed
Kasese	0.56	36	0.003
Arua	0.58	36	0.002
Wakiso	0.76	36	.0023
Jinja	0.32	36	.00523

As indicated in the table above, the relationship is insignificant but positive for Kasese(r= 0.56, p=0.003), Arua (r= 0.58, p=0.002), Wakiso(r= .176, p=0.0023), and Jinja r = .032, p =.00523.

The study explored the relationship between compliance and time. The findings are indicated below:

Table 8: Correlations: Compliance Vs time

District	R	N	P values(2 tailed
Kasese	0.14	36	0.00535
Arua	0. 168	36	0.00454
Wakiso	.070	36	0.00756
Jinja	.135	36	0.00550

As indicated in the table above, the relationship insignificant but positive for Kasese(r= 0.14, p=0.535), Arua(r=0.168, p=0.454), Wakiso(r= 0.070, p=0.756), and Jinja is (r = .135, p = .550).

The study explored the relationship between compliance and quality of roads. The findings are indicated below:

Table 9: Correlations: Compliance Vs quality

District	R	N	P values(2 tailed
Kasese	0.083	36	0.00712
Arua	0.102	36	0.00652
Wakiso	.402	36	0.00063
Jinja	.144	36	0.00523

As indicated in the table above, the relationship is insignificant but positive for Kasese(r= 0.083 p=0.712), Arua (r= 0.102, p=0.652), Wakiso(r= .402, p=0.063), and Jinja (r= .144, p = .523)

Conclusion: Basing on the correlation findings presented above, the relationship between compliance and time, cost, and quality of road services can be rated as insignificant for almost all districts.

4.8.1 Users' views on the Quality of roads
Although, the end-users may have little influence on the quality and quantity of the purchased services (Telgen 2007), the researcher were of the view that they have good opinions on the quality of road works delivered. This prompted the researchers to explore users' views on the quality of roads. This was to further prove the extent to which the compliance to procurement law affects the quality of roads. The findings indicate that the quality of roads is low.
The quality of roads was measured by ascertaining the level at which users were satisfied with the major characteristics that indicate road quality (in every kilometer of sampled roads): **quality of drainage, amount of potholes, road width, and quality of road surface, quality of sign posts and level of road security.** A total score on the six variables indicated the level of users' satisfaction with the quality of the road. The lowest expected value was 27(1 multiplied

by total items on the six variables) while the highest expected value was 135(5 multiplied by the total items on the six variables.

Table 10: Showing Users' View of Road Quality across Districts

District	Mean	N	Sd
Wakiso	70	101	13.1
Jinja	62	98	17.3
Kasese	64	90	13.6
Arua	67	87	11.1
Total	65	376	16.4

As indicated in the table above, all the four districts had weak scores on the quality of roads they use. Only one score was above the median (135/2= 67.5). This implies that users are not fully satisfied with the quality of roads in their districts. Wakiso district users had higher scores (70), followed by Arua (67), Kasese (64) and Jinja (62). This implies that districts procurement departments' compliance with road maintenance standards required by PROCUREMENT LAW is not translated into quality works.

The study also explored the characteristics of the roads that were found acceptable by the users. The table below indicates the responses.

Table 12: Mean Scores on Quality of Road Characteristics

Characteristic	N	Min	Max	Mean	Sd
Drainage	150	5.00	23.00	14.7	3.0
Potholes	152	8.00	25.00	16.9	3.8
Width	161	4.00	20.00	13.4	3.9
Road surface	168	4.00	20.00	13.2	3.4
Signposts	155	4.00	20.00	12.2	4.0
Satisfaction	157	5.00	25.00	17.9	4.7

The table above indicates the score on satisfaction (score= 17.9), and level of potholes (score=16.9) as slightly high. Respondents were less satisfied with road width (13.2), road surface (12.2), signposts (12.2) and drainage (14.5).

DISCUSSION:

Quality and timeliness of works: 80% of the interviewed stakeholders were blaming the contractors for poor quality works; and the bureaucracy in the tendering process for the delays. According to the accounting officer (Kasese), the poor quality and

delays of road works cannot be attributed to the contractors only. These two variables depend on many factors. He said that the parties to the contract are partly responsible; but the major cause is the inadequate and late funding from the central government. This opinion was raised by over 70% of the interviewed district officials. The Wakiso district Engineer attributed the talk of poor quality to the ignorance of the end –users who do not understand the individual contract terms. He said that contractors work according to the contract terms that mainly depend on funds available. "Districts have no funds for high quality roads". He said.

The interviewed local councilors confirmed a deterioration in quality, with roads becoming narrower, with a poor drainage system (some drainages are constructed like humps across roads), sign posts not appropriately placed, and v-shaped corrugated surfaces that make driving difficult, and overtaking/passing almost impossible. "The big Lorries force us off the road". One of the drivers of small car remarked.

Compliance to the law: In an NPT organized workshop (for district procurement officials) at Makerere University business school,[2] it was established from all the district and municipality procurement officials who attended that they are influenced by their bosses in awarding of tenders. They were concerned of how they could avoid that; otherwise they could lose their jobs if they do not obey the employers. The official from Wakiso said that they all comply with the legal requirements in assessing tenders but then the awarding and subsequent management of the contracts is influenced by the top officials.

The Butler group defines **compliance** as adhering to the law, regulations and standards that apply in a given procurement setting. The group term compliance as a plethora of red tape that affects organizations of all complexions (Davis et all, 2005). However application of effective information systems may reduce the red tape and make compliance easier. The focus should be on enhancing value for money, achieving fairness, openness, and transparency without restricting public servants in a tangle of rules. A culture of ethics, and innovation should cultivated (Dye, 2005).

Compliance is a problem not only in the third world countries, but even countries in the European Union (Gelderman 2006, Boer, 1998). The major reason for non compliance in developed countries is to

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[2] NPT workshop at MUBS, on 12/12/08.

avoid the red tape involved, and that in third world is connected with corruption (Hunja).

Steane et al, continues to say that procurement system implemented with sound management practices in place ensure successful service delivery to stakeholders. The sound practices demand that those responsible for implementing procurement should ensure that the objectives are clear and that quality services are sustained. There should be sound client and contract deliverer competencies in communication, team building relationships and sound planning for control (Walker and Sidwell 1996). He also says that performance quality should not be measured on the basis of time and cost only but also service quality as well plus other relevant measures

One of the opinion leaders was of the view that competition at district level is also reducing with the creation of more districts. Some of the new districts have no even a single viable road constructor. They outsource contractors from other districts, especially from the central region

According to Evenet (2003), market-based system work best when constructive pressure exist (through competition) to change and improve pricing, quality, or performance of a product – to satisfy customers needs. Good governance is only possible when corrupt practices are minimized, and financial accountability is enhanced. However despite the creation of new laws, corruption in Uganda is still stifling competition at all levels.

One of the opinion leaders was sure that corruption at local government level is rampart as exemplified by local reports in the print and electronic media. Corruption is one of the causes for poor service delivery.

One of the contractors revealed late and inadequate funding for most LG contracts. He said they have to borrow money to complete the projects and yet the interest rates are very high. Some late contracts are renegotiated and prices adjusted upwards. "Every wise contractor must consider tokens to district officials, and other side costs in the contract price – thus the high cost for most contracts." he said. The contractors prefer timely execution of contracts, to save costs. The delays are mainly attributed to government bureaucracy, and management weaknesses at LG level induced by corrupt tendencies.

Value For Money: The concept of best "value for money" is defined as the optimum combination of the whole life cost and quality (or fitness of purpose) to meet the customers' requirements or add value to organizations (Evennet 2004, Telgen 2007, Weele 2005). The

value for money gains can be in form of cash and staff time savings, expenditure avoidance, quality improvements, and overall change in welfare of taxpayers.

Procurement Practices: There is limited literature on public procurement practices in third world countries (Evenett 2004), the little that is available reveal that practices vary across nations an they are influenced by legal, political, and social forces (Telgen 2007). It is a tool through which governments in third world countries use to influence social and political outcomes.

In some instances it acts as a basis for rewarding political supporters, recognizing and favouring well placed firms, or those that can afford kickbacks, and those whose owners can intimidate the procuring officials. The practices vary across many dimensions like countries legal system and cultures, organizations, and management levels and strategies (Evenett 2005). There is little evidence on the benefits and costs of the existing practices. Empirical analyses of domestic practices are limited. The problem of corrupt practices is common in all countries although the level of corruption also vary across countries.

Good practices may be a basis for reducing poverty and attaining social and political goals – getting the most out of the limited state funds. It contributes to sound management of public expenditures (Hunja 2003), growth of the small scale enterprises and thus the local economy (McCrudden 2004). Good practices attract donors, investors, and they may condition access to foreign markets. Poor practices that corrupt the process lead to extra expenditures for public budgets, reduce competition, and quality of services, discourage investment and innovation – disabling an economy.

Tenders are awarded to the most advantageous, low cost – according to the evaluation criteria stipulated in the notices. The GPA allows third world countries to negotiate exclusion clauses in preferences of local firms. Local procurement reduces monitoring costs, boosts local economy, and creates employment. However, Hoekman notes that the favouring of local firms may breed corruption. Most developing countries, for various reasons, have chosen not to subject their procurement policies to international scrutiny.

Out sourcing for Local governments in road maintenance may achieve a number of goals, including: Reducing costs; increasing efficiency; improving quality; speeding up project delivery; spurring innovation; enhancing risk management; and overcoming a lack of expertise. Some of these objectives may be contradictory. For

example, it may not be possible to realize significant cost savings and, at the same time, dramatically improve quality. However, many of these objectives are complementary. For example, gaining access to expertise, improving efficiency, and spurring innovation are all somewhat related. One benefit of outsourcing is that there isn't a one-size-fits-all answer. In fact, public/private partnerships afford policy makers an opportunity to make tradeoffs between different goals and customize the outsourcing package that meets their specific needs and goals. Improve overall system efficiency through competition and specialization (Segal et al 2003).
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSION:

This study sought to establish whether the procurement officials and outsourced private service providers comply with procurement law. It also sought to establish whether compliance to the law lead to:

- Timely road work delivery
- Cost effective road works delivery
- Quality road works.

The findings indicate a moderate level of compliance across all sampled contracts. Non compliance was reported in contract awards and management, and in the complaint system. The district procurement officials and contractors fulfill the basic requirements in executing the procurement function. The monitoring bodies focus mainly on records and less on actual delivery of contracts – thus procurement officials endeavor to streamline records and meanwhile play hide and seek on contract delivery.

Whether the compliance to the law translates into timely road works: On average, the relationship is insignificant ($r = .103$, $p = . 0.00574$). The findings indicate that emphasis is put on fulfillment of legal procedures/requirements and less on timely works. Therefore there is delay in service delivery blamed mainly on red tape in government funding, poor capacity of contractors, weather, and interferences from central government officials.

Whether the compliance to the law translates into value for money: the findings indicate (on average) a weak correlation of ($r = .56$, p 0.00313). Although the target is to reduce costs and uplift quality of road works, on the ground this is not happening. Costs are instead increasing and quality reducing.

Whether there is a relationship between compliance and quality of road works: The findings indicate (average of districts) a weak relationship (r = .183, p =0.00488)

5.2 Policy Implications:
1. Strengthen ICT applications, and Strategic Management
It was established that compliance does not automatically lead to cost effective, timely, and quality road works delivery. The recommendation is that:

Relevant measures should be instituted to sharpen the translation of the observance of the law into value for money purchases, and timely delivery of quality works. This can be achieved with for example, application of modern information systems at all local administration levels, effective management with sound strategic planning and control, with measures that ensure that user needs are sought in time and relevant procurement planning and execution carried out in time. Possibly the benchmarking of local or foreign local governments could be of great assistance.

2. Contract management:
The supervision should be strengthened at all stages of contracting, and delivery of works, The focus should be on quality outputs. A mechanism should be instituted to check on the works supervisors and accounting officers' misconducts and interferences in the procurement processes; and to empower providers to complain for any violation of the law noticed. Undercover checks and balances could serve a better purpose since the conventional ones are failing.

5. Training and development
The officials should undergo ongoing, intensive and wholesome training to improve on competence and integrity. The global environment is too dynamic, complex and thus turbulent requiring flexibility in the execution of the procurement functions. Products are changing constantly, so are specifications. Procurement officials must be fully knowledgeable of these changes to effectively perform. If there is need, the department should be financially facilitated to outsource some expertise in situation of complex specifications.

7. Increase Competition in Tendering
Contractors are mainly concentrated around the Ugandan central region, and reduce with distance from the capital city. The creation of tiny districts has reduced competition at district level. With inadequate competition, efficiency and effectiveness inroad works will continue to suffer. The government should Endeavour to set policies that boost competition especially at district levels.

9. Insist on Timely Funding

Lastly, the major hindrance cited for the poor delivery of road works is the late and under funding of the sector by the central government. Relevant lobbying should be carried out by local politicians, relevant NGO's and CBO's to ensure adequate and timely funding of the sector. It is good the government has given the highest priority to this sector this financial year. Emphasis should be on appropriate use of the funds.

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